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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS-
THE RIGHTS OF A NON-TENURED TEACHER UPON
NON-RENEWAL OF HIS CONTRACT AT A
STATE SCHOOL
David F. Roth was employed on probationary status by the Board of
Regents of State Colleges as an assistant professor at the Wisconsin State
University at Oshkosh1 for one academic year commencing September 1,
1968. His employment appointment contained the following language: 2
The employment of any staff member for an academic year shall not be for a term
beyond June 30th of the fiscal year in which the appointment is made. . . . Regula-
tions governing tenure are in accord with Chapter 37.31 Wisconsin Statutes. 3
In February of 1969 Roth was informed without explanation that he
would not be rehired for the following year. He brought suit in a federal
district court in Wisconsin alleging that he was denied re-employment be-
cause of his exercise of constitutionally protected freedom of speech, and
also that the decision not to re-employ him without providing a statement
of reasons and a hearing thereon violated his procedural due process
rights under the fourteenth amendment. The district court stayed pro-
ceedings on the claim regarding exercise of first amendment speech rights,
1. In the 1971 session of the Wisconsin legislature the Regents of the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin were merged with the Board of Regents of State Colleges.
The new board is now known as the Board of Regents of the University of Wis-
consin System. The State University at Oshkosh is now known as the University
of Wisconsin at Oshkosh. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 36.02 (Supp. 1972-73).
2. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 5, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972).
3. State tenure laws are the primary source of procedural safeguards for
teachers. The pertinent language of WIs. STAT. ANN. § 37.31 (1969), incorpo-
rated by reference in Roth's contract, provided clear rights for permanently em-
ployed teachers but did not set up detailed procedural protection for newly selected
teachers who had not yet acquired tenure: "(1) All teachers in any state uni-
versity shall initially be employed on probation. The employment shall be perma-
nent, during efficiency and good behavior after 4 years of continuous service in
the state university system as a teacher. . . . No teacher who has become perma-
nently employed as herein provided shall be discharged except for cause upon
written charges . . . . [Sluch teacher may appeal the discharge by a written no-
tice to the president of the board of regents of state colleges. The board shall
cause the charges to be investigated, hear the case and provide such teacher with a
written statement as to their decision." The legislature has since increased the
probationary period to six years. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 37.31 (Supp. 1972-73).
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and granted summary judgment in favor of Roth on the procedural issues."
This decision, granting non-tenured teachers more extensive rights upon
non-retention than they had enjoyed previously, was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, one judge dissenting,5 and aroused
a great deal of interest from educational institutions and teacher groups.6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari7 and subsequently a divided Court
reversed on the procedural issues. 8 The majority opinion, delivered by
Mr. Justice Stewart, held that only the deprivation of interests encompassed
in the fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty and property are sub-
ject to the requirements of procedural due process. The respondent
did not have a "liberty" interest in re-employment because "[t]he
State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any charge
against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in
his community . . . . [Nor had the state] imposed on him . . . [any]
other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities."" The respondent did not have a "property"
interest in re-employment because, "to have a property interest in a bene-
4. Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
5. Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971). This decision
went far beyond the already diverse holdings of other courts of appeals in affording
probationary teachers procedural rights upon non-retention, thus broadening the
conflict among the circuit courts and clearing the way for a great volume of liti-
gation [see Judge Duffy's dissenting opinion, 446 F.2d at 812] brought by non-
tenured teachers who are aggrieved when their contracts are not renewed.
6. Nine amici curiae briefs were filed during the course of the litigation in
the court of appeals and the Supreme Court. Six briefs were filed on behalf of
educational institutions which opposed Roth's claim. They were: A brief in the
court of appeals, a brief for a writ of certiorari, and a brief in the Supreme
Court all written on behalf of the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Uni-
versities of Illinois, the Board of Regents of Regency Universities of Illinois, the
Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, the American Association of
State Colleges and Universities, the American Council on Education, the Associa-
tion of American Colleges and the National Association of State Universities and
Land-Grant Colleges. In the Supreme Court, three briefs were filed opposing
Roth's claim by the Board of Trustees of the California State Colleges, the City
of New York, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Also in the Supreme
Court, three amici curiae briefs were filed in support of Roth's claim. They
were written on behalf of the Wisconsin Education Association, the American
Federation of Teachers, and the American Association of University Professors.
7. Board of Regents v. Roth, 404 U.S. 909 (1971).
8. "The only question presented to us at this stage in the case is whether the
respondent had a constitutional right to a statement of reasons and a hearing on
the University's decision not to rehire him for another year." Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
9. Id. Justices Stewart, Burger, White, Blackmun and Rehnquist joined in the
majority opinion. Justices Marshall and Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas
joined, filed dissenting opinions. Justice Powell abstained.
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fit, a person . . . must . . . have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it
. . . . [T]he terms of the respondent's appointment secured absolutely
. . . no possible claim of entitlement to re-employment."' 1  The courts
below, therefore, erred in granting summary judgment for the respondent
on the procedural due process issue. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972).
The scope of the Roth decision is clarified by the decision of the Su-
preme Court in Perry v. Sindermann," a companion case decided on the
same day as Roth which presented a different facet of the same due
process claim to notice and a hearing upon the state school's failure to
renew a non-tenured teacher's employment contract. Sindermann had
been employed in the Texas college and university system, which had no
formal tenure policy, for a period of ten years, the last four of which
were under successive annual contracts at Odessa Junior College. The Re-
gents then declined to renew his contract for the following year without
giving him a statement of reasons for the action. The respondent alleged
that the non-renewal was in retaliation for his public criticism of the col-
lege administration, and he claimed an expectancy in re-employment
based on a de facto tenure policy officially promulgated by the college.
He offered to prove that a teacher with his long employment at Odessa
Junior College had as much a "property" right to continued employment
as did a formally tenured teacher at a college which operated on a statu-
tory tenure system, and therefore he was entitled to procedural safeguards
(i.e., a statement of reasons and a hearing) under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment upon non-renewal of his contract. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of the school board on the
grounds that Sindermann's contract had expired. This decision was re-
versed by the court of appeals,' 2 which held that if nonretention was
based upon free speech rights then he was entitled to constitutional pro-
tection. The Supreme Court affirmed this result and held:
Mhe respondent alleged that the college had a de facto tenure program ..[based on] [r]ules and understandings, promulgated and fostered by state officials
• . . [and he] [m]ust be given an opportunity to prove the legitimacy of his claim
... . [S]uch proof would obligate college officials to grant a hearing at his re-
quest, where he could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and challenge
their sufficiency.' 8
10. Id. at 573-78.
11. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
12. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 402
U.S. 917 (1971).
13. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597-603 (1972).
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These are the first cases in which the Supreme Court examined the
question of the re-employment rights of probationary public school teach-
ers whose contracts are not renewed. This note will examine the conflict
concerning the re-employment rights of non-tenured teachers which ex-
isted before Roth among the courts of appeals, analyze the Supreme Court
decisions in Roth and Sindermann and point out the significance of these
decisions in the area of public employment generally.
Originally, a teaching job at a state school, like all government em-
ployment, was considered a privilege not a right, and was excluded from
due process protections because such employment did not come within
the literal interpretation of the terms "life," "liberty" or "property" under
the fourteenth amendment. 14  However, this privilege theory15 has been
eroded by the decisions in a number of "loyalty oath" cases' 6 in which
the Supreme Court recognized that interests in public employment are
protected by due process in certain situations.
At the time of the Roth litigation, the most recent guidelines from the
Supreme Court regarding the requirements of procedural due process in
the dismissal of a public employee were contained in Cafeteria Workers
v. McElroy.17  In this case the Court used a "balancing test" in which
the procedural safeguards necessary to satisfy due process upon termina-
tion of public employment would be determined by balancing the govern-
ment and private interests involved in each particular case. Under this
test the precise procedural requirements can vary depending on the impor-
tance of the competing interests and do not depend upon the definition
of "liberty" or "property" which was the case under the "privilege doc-
trine."18
It is well settled that a non-tenured public school teacher cannot be
terminated for reasons that are constitutionally impermissible. Courts
have held that dismissal on racial grounds, 19 or termination which is an
14. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
15. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892);
Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.D.C. 1950), aff'd mem., 341 U.S. 918
(1951).
16. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 474 (1952); Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474 (1959); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See also, Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
17. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
18. K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.12 (1958).
19. Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966); Johnson v. Branch,
364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966); Franklin v. County School Board, 360 F.2d 325
(4th Cir. 1966).
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infringement on the employee's right against self-incrimination, 20 or on
his first amendment rights of free religion, 21 association 22 and speech2 s
are clearly unconstitutional. The current controversy regarding non-ten-
ured teachers is centered on the issue of whether they are entitled to a
statement of reasons and a hearing thereon as a constitutional right under
the fourteenth amendment when their contracts are not renewed and no
right to renewal is provided by state statute or by academic policy of the
school. The courts of appeals which have decided cases involving this
question have formulated three divergent views.
The fourth, 24 sixth, 25 eighth 20 and tenth27 circuits have held that neither
a statement of reasons nor a hearing is required because the non-tenured
teacher who is terminated has no claim for these safeguards based on the
fourteenth amendment. These circuits viewed the issue as a matter to
be resolved on the basis of state tenure law.
The fifth circuit has held in several recent cases that non-tenured teach-
ers are entitled to both a statement of reasons and a hearing if they can
show that they have an "expectancy" of continued employment even
though there was no formal tenure system in effect. 28  When there is an
official tenure system in operation the "expectancy" requirement can
never be met by a non-tenured teacher. 29
The first circuit"0 has held that upon non-renewal of a contract the
probationary teacher is entitled to a statement of the reasons for the de-
cision of the school authorities but not a hearing; the seventh circuit 3'
20. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
21. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
22. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
23. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). But see Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1969).
24. Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1965), aff'd per
curiam, 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965).
25. Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971).
26. Freeman v. Gould Special School District, 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969).
27. Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
991 (1970).
28. Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970); Lucas v. Chapman, 430
F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1970); Sinderman v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1970),
aff'd, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
29. Thaw v. Board of Public Instruction, 432 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1970).
30. Drown v. Portsmouth School District, 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971).
31. Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 564
(1972); Shirck v. Thomas, 447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971).
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held that the teacher is entitled to both reasons and a hearing. These two
circuits base their reasoning on the "balancing of interest" test introduced
by the Supreme Court in Cafeteria Workers, and the difference in the pro-
cedures required by due process outlined by the respective courts is the re-
sult of the different values which were assigned to the competing govern-
mental and private interests.3 2
It was against this background of diversity at the appellate level that
the Supreme Court considered the question of the procedural rights of non-
tenured teachers. In addition to fourteenth amendment procedural due
process rights the Court was confronted with related issues of state tenure
laws,33 first amendment rights, 34 academic freedom 35 and latent issues
affecting public employees generally.A6 However, the Court declined
judgment on the related issues and instead based its decision on an analy-
sis of the fourteenth amendment, which had not been argued by the par-
ties or suggested by the amici curiae briefs filed in the proceedings.3 7
The majority in Roth noted that under the state law in Wisconsin 8
and under the terms of his contract, Roth was entitled to nothing beyond
his one year appointment, 39 and therefore the decision whether or not to
32. In Drown the court found: "mhe interests of the non-tenured teacher in
knowing the basis for his non-retention are so substantial and .. . the inconveni-
ence and disadvantages for a school board of supplying this information are so
slight as to require a written explanation, in some detail, of the reasons for non-
retention . . . however . .. a hearing is not constitutionally compelled [because of
the expense and great additional burden which would be placed on the board]."
435 F.2d 1182, 1185-86 (1970).
In Roth the court of appeals found that a probationary teacher is entitled to
both reasons and a hearing because "the substantial adverse effect non-retention is
likely to have upon the career interests of an individual professor . . . [outweighs]
the governmental interest in unembarrassed exercise of discretion in pruning a
faculty.... ." 446 F.2d at 809.
33. This issue was raised in the brief of the petitioner, the Board of Regents of
State Colleges, and in the four amici curiae briefs filed in opposition to Roth's
claim. See supra note 6.
34. This issue was argued by the respondent, Roth, and by Justice Brennan in
his dissenting opinion (joined by Justice Douglas).
35. This issue was raised in the three amici curiae briefs filed in support of
Roth's claim. See supra note 6. It was also argued by Justice Brennan (joined by
Justice Douglas) in his dissenting opinion.
36. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972).
37. See text supra, at 2-3.
38. See supra note 3.
39. "[The terms of his appointment] secured his interest in employment up to
June 30, 1969. But the important fact in this case is that they specifically pro-
vided that the respondent's employment was to terminate on June 30 . . . . [T]hey
19731
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
rehire him was left to the discretion of university officials. The majority's
decision turned on the fact that because the respondent had made no
showing that the determination not to rehire him had somehow deprived
him of an interest in "liberty" 40 or "property," 41 he was therefore unable
to base his claim for a statement of reasons and a hearing on the proce-
dural due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
This determination prompted two sharp dissents. Mr. Justice Brennan,
joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, pointed out that a major issue in the
course of the litigation was whether or not the case should have been de-
cided on the basis of first amendment rights. He noted that the action had
been initiated in the district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,42 claiming in
part, that the decision not to rehire the respondent was in retaliation for
exercising his right of free speech. Consequently, he argued that the ma-
jority's denial of relief to Roth's claim for a statement of reasons and an op-
portunity to be heard left him, as a practical matter, without constitu-
tional protection for the alleged deprivation of his first amendment rights
since there were no safeguards against abuse of discretion by the school's
officials in their rehiring practices. Justice Brennan, as Justice Douglas,
places a high value on academic freedom43 and advocates affording teach-
made no provision for renewal whatsoever." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. at 578.
40. "The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any charge
against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his com-
munity. . . . Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in declining to re-
employ the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed
his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities .... Had it
done so, this, again, would be a different case. . . . It stretches the concept too
far to suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is not rehired
in one job but remains as free as before to seek another." Id. at 573-75.
41. "Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Ra-
ther they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or under-
standings that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . . [Tihe re-
spondent's 'property' interest in employment at the Wisconsin State University-
Oshkosh was created and defined by the terms of his appointment. . . . They
supported absolutely no possible claim of entitlement to re-employment. Nor, sig-
nificantly, was there any state statute or University rule or policy that secured
his interest in re-employment or that created any legitimate claim to it." Id.
at 577-78. See also Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1971);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
42. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceedings for redress."
43. "We repeated that warning in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
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ers, whether tenured or not, protection of their constitutional rights by
making the non-renewal of a teaching contract in itself the basis for in-
voking procedural safeguards. 4
Mr. Justice Marshall, conversely, agreed in a separate dissent that Roth's
first amendment claim was properly extracted from the litigation and that
the majority's framework for the decision according to the terms of "lib-
erty" and "property" under the fourteenth amendment was well reasoned.
However, his concept of public employment45 and his desire to insure
against abuse in the area 46 impelled him to argue in favor of Roth. Justice
Marshall advocates a broader definition for the terms "liberty" and "prop-
erty" in order to enable the respondent to state a claim under the four-
teenth amendment. 47
The key to the majority's decision in both Roth and Sindermann is
contained in Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion filed in the Sinder-
mann case:
[TIhere is one central point in both decisions that I would like to underscore since
it may have been obscured in the comprehensive discussion of the cases. That point
is that the relationship between a state institution and one of its teachers is essen-
tially a matter of state concern and state law. The Court holds today only that a
state-employed teacher who has a right to re-employment under state law, arising
from either an express or implied contract, has, in turn, a right guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to some form of prior administrative or academic hearing on
the cause for nonrenewal of his contract. Thus whether a particular teacher in a
particular context has any right to such administrative hearing hinges on a question
of state law.48
603: 'Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which
is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. .. .'
No more direct assault on academic freedom can be imagined than for the school
authorities to be allowed to discharge a teacher because of his or her philosophical,
political, or ideological beliefs." 408 U.S. at 581-82 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44. See generally Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional
Right, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 447, 457 (1963). See, e.g., Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
45. "Employment is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, benefits that gov-
ernments offer in modern-day life." 408 U.S. at 589.
46. "[W]hen an application for public employment is denied or the contract of
a government employee is not renewed, the government must say why, for it is
only when the reasons underlying government action are known that citizens feel
secure and protected against arbitrary government action." Id. at 589.
47. "I would go further than the Court does in defining the terms 'liberty' and
'property'. . . . In my view, every citizen who applies for a government job is
entitled to it unless the government can establish some reason for denying the
employment. This is the 'property' right that I believe is protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment and cannot be denied 'without due process of law.' And it is
also liberty-liberty to work-which is the 'very essence of the personal freedom
and opportunity' secured by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 588, 589.
48. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 603-04 [emphasis added].
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Sindermann, who had ten years of teaching experience in the Texas State
College System, alleged an entitlement to continued employment based
on a de facto tenure policy arising from officially promulgated rules and
an understanding fostered at the college where he was formerly em-
ployed.4 9 Since the majority felt he had alleged a sufficient "property"
interest under state law he was entitled to reasons and a hearing upon
non-renewal of his annual contract. Roth, who had about six months
of experience at the State University at Oshkosh before he was notified
that he would not be rehired, alleged that he was constitutionally entitled
to a statement of reasons and a hearing under the procedural due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment before the school board could make
the decision not to rehire him. He was afforded neither reasons nor a
hearing upon non-retention because he had alleged no "liberty" or "prop-
erty" right based on state law.
The decisions in Roth and Sindermann thus indicate situations where
due process procedures should be invoked to protect a probationary
teacher upon non-retention by applying tests as to what employment in-
terests are encompassed within the terms "liberty" and "property" under
the fourteenth amendment. In Roth the Court held that a person's inter-
est in re-employment is included under "liberty" only if his non-retention
by the state seriously damaged his reputation or foreclosed other employ-
ment by the state.5 0 A person's interest in re-employment is included
under "property" if he has a "legitimate claim of entitlement" 51 to re-
employment. In Sindermann the Court held that a person has a "prop-
erty" interest for due process purposes if there are such rules of "mutually
explicit understandings" 52 promulgated by the state that support his claim
to re-employment.
By deciding Roth and Sindermann on this basis the Supreme Court
settled the question of when due process protections apply but declined
49. "'Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Adminis-
tration of the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent
tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he displays a
cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and his superiors, and as long as he is
happy in his work.' Moreover, the respondent claimed legitimate reliance upon
guidelines promulgated by the Coordinating Board of the Texas College and Uni-
versity System ...... Id. at 600. The relevant provision of the guidelines in ef-
fect was: "(1) Beginning with appointment to the rank of full-time instructor or a
higher rank, the probationary period for a faculty member shall not exceed seven
years, including within this period appropriate full-time service in all institutions of
higher education." Id. at 600, note 6.
50. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.
51. Id. at 577.
52. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 601.
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to decide the constitutional issue of what specific procedures were re-
quired under the fourteenth amendment to protect a non-tenured teacher
who is not rehired. A resolution of this issue was sought by the amici
curiae on behalf of both the school administrations and the teacher
groups and was the most significant question left unanswered by the
Court. Such procedural safeguards were left for a determination on a case-
by-case basis after the non-tenured teacher could initially show that the
source of his alleged "property" interest was based on state law (tenure
law or de facto tenure provisions promulgated by state officials).
While both cases involved university professors, the Court's language
regarding the application of due process protections would appear appli-
cable to a broader group of public employees, whose rights upon job
termination are still unsettled. Public employees subject to some type of
statutory provision for continued employment clearly have a "legitimate
claim of entitlement" to their jobs under the Roth test which gives rise to
due process protections upon termination, but this will not greatly enlarge
the basis for procedural due process claims under the fourteenth amend-
ment because these employees already receive job protection under civil
service laws.5 3 However, the absence of such statutory provisions is not
conclusive as to whether a discharged employee is entitled to due process
protections. The broader "mutually explicit understandings" test in Sin-
dermann will provide a basis for due process claims by persons who do
not have express contractual or statutory guarantees of continued employ-
ment if they can prove the state employer officially fostered some sort
of de facto job expectancy policy. In the case of Norlander v. Schleck,54
a federal district court in essence extended the "mutually explicit un-
derstandings" language of Sindermann to protect against arbitrary re-
moval from a civil service list-a potential employment status. There
the plaintiff, not yet employed, was removed from a civil service employ-
ment list because of alleged unsatisfactory references, the substance of
which were not disclosed to her. The court found:
[E]xistence of a civil service system implies a right to, or an interest in, fair consid-
eration for public employment. . . . [T]he due process clause requires the source
53. But see Christian v. Department of Labor, 347 F. Supp. 1158 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) in which Judge Frankel's dissenting opinion suggests that the distinction
between permanent and probationary status is a shaky ground on which to exclude
a small group of federal employees from due process protections. The majority
opinion upheld a denial of state unemployment compensation and a hearing
thereon to a federal probationary employee based on findings by his former federal
employer that the dismissal was because of misconduct. But see Fitzgerald v.
Hampton, 467 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
54. 345 F. Supp. 595 (D.D.C. 1972).
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and substance of the references which are unsatisfactory be revealed so that they
may be refuted if possible and a reasonable opportunity afforded so to do. 55
The question of remedies available to a terminated public employee
once he shows that he is entitled to due process protection was presented
to a federal district court in the case of Kennedy v. Sanchez.56 Kennedy
was a discharged federal employee, who was entitled to due process pro-
tections under the Roth "legitimate claim of entitlement" test, because a
civil service statute applicable to him provided that he could be re-
moved "only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the serv-
ice. 15 7 The court found that the procedure by which Kennedy could be
discharged must include the following due process requirements:
[A] full evidentiary hearing prior to termination, with the right to be heard by an
impartial hearing officer; the right to present witnesses; the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses; and the right to a written decision indicating the
reasons for discharge or suspension and the evidence relied upon . . . . [T]hese
rights are basic to a fair and effective hearing and must be provided if the em-
ployee's interest is to be adequately protected.5 8
In so far as the procedure by which Kennedy was terminated lacked the
above requirements the action was declared unconstitutional and an or-
der was entered to reinstate him to his former position with back pay.
It is thus possible that many public employees terminated without ex-
planation will be able to state a claim within the fourteenth amendment
procedural due process safeguards--especially under the "mutually ex-
plicit understandings" test of Sindermann which, as the Norlander opinion
indicates, may prove to be quite extensive. This would entitle the em-
ployee to a full evidentiary hearing followed by a statement of reasons
for the decision finally reached as required by Kennedy.
Loss of public employment is a critical event for the individual con-
cerned and fair treatment is important from both the standpoint of the
general public as well as the terminated employee. Yet because of the
great number of public employees and the high cost to the employer of af-
fording all who are terminated a full evidentiary hearing it is questionable
whether the existing judicial guidelines furnish an adequate practical
standard for handling termination cases. Undoubtedly a consideration
of this problem will be the subject of future cases, and possible legisla-
tive action may be required to establish procedures that are fair to all.
William E. Kenny
55. Id. at 598, 600.
56. 349 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. I11. 1972).
57. Id. at 865.
58. Id. at 864, 865. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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